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SEC "LINE OF BUSINESS" REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
A. A. SOMMER, JR.*
Among the most intense pressures created by the current (or perhaps
"recently past" is a more correct appellation in view of the activities of
Congress, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants and others) wave of mergers has
been the demand for some manner of reporting the profitability of segments
of enterprises. Considering the long struggle to gain uniform acceptance of
consolidated statements (a process completed perhaps only in the Atlantic
Research matter),' this new move toward fragmentation may be startling to
many. The demand has come from many sources. First, the antitrust
militants insisted that current reporting practices obscured information
desirable for two purposes: one, to facilitate enforcement of antitrust laws
by exposing anticompetitive practices, e.g., predatory pricing in one segment
supported by monopolistic prices in another; and two, to encourage com-
petition attracted by the knowledge that inordinate profits were being
realized by a segment of a diversified enterprise.2 The investment community
took up the cry and asserted that in many instances the absence of such in-
formation prevented effective analysis of a company's historical earnings and
future prospects.3 In the wake of these powerful voices, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, after careful study, did something about the prob-
lem, though not enough to quiet the cries of the antitrust advocates and
the investment analysts.
Arrayed against these advocates have been powerful segments of the
A.B., University of Notre Dame, 1948; LL.B., Harvard University, 1950. Member of
Ohio Bar.
1 In re Atlantic Research Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4657 (Dec. 6, 1963). In
this matter, the registrant had had the practice in its annual reports of including only
financial reports of the parent, instead of fully consolidated statements which would have
reflected the losses of certain subsidiaries. As a consequence of this case, the Securities and
Exchange Commission amended rule 14a-3 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
require the inclusion of consolidated statements in annual reports and that either the
principles of consolidation or other accounting principles and practices, or methods of
applying accounting principles and practices, used in preparing the financial statements
contained in filings with the Commission, prindpally Form 10-K, and those contained in
annual reports correspond, or any differences be noted and the effect thereof reconciled
or explained.
2 Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 40 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 1877-78 (1966) (testi-
mony of Dr. Willard F. Mueller, then Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade
Commission) [hereinafter cited as Concentration Hearings]; Blair, Antitrust Implications
of Conglomerate Reporting, in PUBLiC REPORTING BY CONGLOMERATES 25 (A. Rappaport,
P. Firmin & S. Zeff eds. 1968).
3 Concentration Hearings, pt. 4, at 1705 (testimony of Yura Arkus-Duntov, an invest-
ment officer of the Dreyfus Fund).
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business community, 4 although an increasing number of companies which
might be called "conglomerates" have divulged more and more information
concerning the results of operations of their segments.5 Nonetheless, the
complaints from the business community concerning the proposals for seg-
mented reporting have been loud and plaintive - and continuing.6
The opposition of the business community has largely been along the
following lines:
(1) Disclosure of segmented profitability will benefit competitors by
providing them with useful information, which can be used to the detriment
of the shareholders of the reporting corporation in connection with pricing
policies and the like.
(2) Such disclosure will injure the reporting company which is realizing
a high profit in one unit by arming its customers with information which
they will use to drive prices - and profits - down.
(3) Such disclosure will give a powerful bargaining tool to unions in
units which are realizing high profitability.
(4) Such disclosure will discourage innovation, experimentation and
the commitment of capital for new developments, since management will
fear shareholder criticism for utilizing the resources of the enterprise in
losing activities, particularly if they are somewhat prolonged before becom-
ing profitable.
(5) Such disclosure would not, because of diversities inherent in busi-
nesses, varying practices for allocating administrative and other central
costs, and intracorporate transfers, provide any meaningful information to
investors.
The recent proposals for conglomerate disclosure did not arrive on
the scene without antecedents. The April 1945 issue of the Journal of Ac-
countancy contained a persuasive plea by William H. Moore for reporting
the profitability of divisions.7 Further, for many years the Commission has
required that in the Form S-1 description of the registrant's business, any
product or service or class of products or services which contributed more
than 15 percent to the gross volume of business must be identified and its
"relative importance" to the registrant stated. Ordinarily, the Commission
staff, in enforcing this requirement, has simply required a statement of the
sales of component products or services, although it is evident that under
the language quoted it also could have required some statement of profit-
ability. It has, in fact, not been uncommon in recent years for the staff of
the Commission to ask a registrant to state whether the relative contribution
4 MACHINERY AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE, Top MANAGEMENT LOOKS AT PRODUCT-
LINE REPORTING (1967).
5 Hobgood, Voluntary Disclosure in 1968 Annual Reports, FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE,
Aug. 1969, at 64.
6 Profit Breakdown Rule Alarms Some Concerns; SEC Dismisses Fears, Wall Street
Journal, Nov. 5, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
7 Reproduced in Concentration Hearings, pt. 5, at 2143 et seq.
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of each identified product or group of products to profitability was sub-
stantially the same as its relative contribution to sales, and if not, whether
it was less or greater:8 "Under the mentioned requirements .. .we seek
appropriate disclosures where the contribution of a line of products or ser-
vices to sales and revenues is not proportionate to the contribution to
earnings by the line of products and services." 9
In 1964 the scene began to change. Senator Philip A. Hart's Senate
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly held hearings on industrial
concentration, at which witnesses testified that it had become increasingly
difficult to determine the extent of concentration because conglomerate
companies did not disclose the sales of their components. In addition, Dr.
George E. Brandow, former Executive Director of the National Commission
on Food Marketing, expressed concern that conglomerate enterprises might
be engaging in anticompetitive activity by subsidizing price-cutting in one
area with excessively high prices in another.10 Whether conglomerates were
in fact engaging in such activity, he said, was impossible to ascertain from
an examination of their unsegmented financial statements.
In its search for data, the Subcommittee turned to the Commission.
Chairman Manuel F. Cohen submitted a memorandum stating that, in the
opinion of the Commission staff, the Commission possessed sufficient power
to require the disclosures apparently desired by the Subcommittee, but that,
in its estimation, it would be unwise to do so. The memorandum set forth
well the arguments against segmented reporting -including competitive
dangers and the difficulty of allocating common administrative and overhead
items - which have since become familiar."
But after submitting this memorandum, and perhaps stimulated by the
Subcommittee to reexamine its position, the Commission reversed itself,
suggesting that there were, in fact, deficiencies in its disclosure requirements
and stating that it proposed to correct them. 12 However, the Chairman made
it abundantly clear that his concern was not with the development of addi-
tional disclosure to assist antitrust enforcement but was only to aid intel-
ligent investing. 13
8 An example of the manner in which this disclosure often appeared is in the follow-
ing:
During the foregoing periods, generally the group, the
group and the group contributed to the Company's pro forma profits
in substantially the same proportions as their contributions to aggregate pro
forma sales; the group and the group contributed less
proportionately to profits than to sales; and the group contributed
proportionately more to profits than to sales.
9 Memorandum prepared by Office of Chief Accountant and Division of Corporation
Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, with respect to a letter from Senator Gay-
lord Nelson to Chairman Hamer Budge, June 20, 1969.
10 Concentration Hearings, at pt. 5, 1960-62.
11 Id. at pt. 2, 1069 et seq.
12 Id. at pt.. 5, 1981 et seq. (testimony of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, Securities
and Exchange Commission).
13Id. at 1991.
SEC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
THE MAUTZ STUDY
The Commission's change of position generated greatly increased in-
terest in the subject. A committee of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants investigated the problem, pointed out some difficulties,
urged voluntarily expanded segment disclosure, and argued strongly that,
in the event such disclosures were required, they should not be within the
responsibility of accountants. 14 The security analysts pressed for more dis-
closure.15 The Financial Executives Institute, an organization of corporate
financial executives, sponsored an in-depth study of the problem; under
Robert K. Mautz, Professor of Accountancy at the University of Illinois, the
Institute's Research Foundation embarked on a study that took a year and a
half, and produced an extensive research report and a series of recommenda-
tions.' 6
In its published notice of proposed requirements, the Commission
stated that it had considered the Mautz Study, as well as the publications
and suggestions of others. In many respects the Commission seems to have
followed the Mautz recommendations. In others, it has set more stringent
requirements.
The Mautz Study reached these conclusions:' 7
(1) Only companies which operate in more than one "broadly-defined
industry" should be required to "fractionalize themselves for reporting pur-
poses."
a. To be subject to segmented reporting a company must have two
or more components which (1) operate in different industries, broadly-
defined; (2) experience rates of profitability, degrees of risk or opportu-
nities for growth independent of other components; and (3) meet the
test of materiality (see below).
b. Companies whose segments transfer substantial amounts of prod-
ucts to, or receive substantial amounts of products from, other segments
with which they are integrated in a product sense should be considered
unitary in nature.
(2) A company operates in more than one broadly-defined industry
when it receives gross revenue from, derives income from, or utilizes assets
14AICPA, Disclosure of Supplemental Financial Information by Diversified Com-
panies, APB OP. No. 9 (1967).
15 McCallan, A View From the Investment Community, in PUBLIC REPORTING BY CON-
GLOMERATEs 47 (A. Rappaport, P. Firmin & S. Zeff eds. 1968).
16 R. MAUTZ, FINANCIAL REPqORTING BY DIVERSIFIED COMPANIES (1968).
17 Id. at 157-58. It is interesting to note that the Mautz Study utilizes "rates of profit-
ability, degrees of risk or opportunities for growth" in two contexts: in one context these
are used to define a component, and in the second context they are used to define a
"broadly-defined industry." Thus, it would appear that for it to be required that a com-
ponent be reported upon separately it must operate in an industry that is "subject to
significantly different rates of profitability, diverse degrees of risk, or varying opportunities
for growth" as compared with the industries in which other components operate and,
in addition, the component itself must "experience rates of profitability, degrees of risk
or opportunities for growth independent of other components. .... "
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in industries subject to significantly different rates of profitability, diverse
degrees of risk, and varying opportunities for growth. All mechanical
methods of segmenting companies (e.g., the Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion) were rejected in favor of leaving to management the responsibility of
segmenting the company.
(3) The test of materiality referred to above would be met if a com-
ponent in a broadly-defined industry accounted for 15 percent or more of
the company's gross revenues, provided, however, that if this figure was
disproportionate to the income of, or assets used in, the segment, then
"a more representative test of the materiality of the diversification should
be used."
(4) With respect to each segment thus identified and meeting the
materiality test, gross revenues and profitability would have to be disclosed,
the latter either before or after allocation of common or corporate costs
"relative contribution . . . to income." Appropriate disclosure should, of
course, be made concerning the course followed.
(5) If the method of pricing intracompany transfers or allocating
common or corporate costs significantly affects the reported contribution to
income of the segments, the methods used should be disclosed.
(6) The segmented information should be included in the annual re-
port, but not in the financial statements.
(7) If management "sincerely" believes that the disclosures would have
an adverse effect on the interests of shareholders, such disclosure should be
made in lieu of the financial disclosures.
More than three years after Chairman Cohen publicly supported for the
first time expanded "conglomerate disclosure," the Commission adopted a
proposal requiring segmented profitability disclosure by diversified enter-
prises1 s The requirements finally adopted reflected modifications responsive
to a number of criticisms levelled at two earlier published proposals, 19
although many criticized aspects of the proposals have remained substan-
tially unchanged.
The new requirements apply only to registration Forms S-I, S-7 and 10.
The first two forms pertain to public distributions of securities; the last is
the form often used to register securities under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 when they become listed or subject to section 12(g). 20 Thus, there
is at the time of preparation of this article no requirement for segmented
disclosure of profitability in periodic reporting (e.g., Form 10-K), in proxy
statements, or in other filings with the Commission, although as discussed
below a pending proposal would expand the requirements. In the affected
18 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4988 (July 14, 1969).
19 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4949 (Feb. 18, 1969); SEC Securities Act Release No.
4922 (Sept. 4, 1968).
2 0Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires registration under
that Act of companies whose securities are traded over-the-counter, and which have 500
shareholders and assets of at least $1 million. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (Supp. IV 1969).
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forms, the new requirements have become part of the description of the
company's business.
"LINE OF BUSINESS"
The starting point in the Commission's requirements is "line of busi-
ness." The new requirements compel a company which is engaged in more
than one "line of business" to make disclosures in addition to those hereto-
fore required with regard to sales and revenues. It will be recalled that the
basis of segmentation proposed by Mautz was components engaged in
broadly-defined industries.
What then is a "line of business"? There is no definition in the new
requirements, although the Commission indicated the criteria adopted by
the Mautz Study to identify distinct industries and components - varying
rates of profitability, opportunities for growth, and degrees of risk- should
be used to help group products or services as lines of business; the Commis-
sion rules require that the basis for the grouping should be "briefly de-
scribed." It may be that delineation of lines of business by means of these
concepts may be considerably more difficult than identifying "broadly
defined" industries. The Commission dismissed suggestions that it seek to
define "lines of business" with greater precision by indicating in its release
that management was in the best position to do this because of the very
nature of American business:
[I]n view of the numerous ways in which companies are organized to do
business, the variety of products and services, the history of predecessor
and acquired companies, and the diversity of operating characteristics,
such as markets, raw materials, manufacturing processes and competitive
conditions, it is not deemed feasible or desirable to be more specific in
defining a line of business. Management, because of its familiarity with
company structure, is in the most informed position to separate the
company into components on a reasonable basis for reporting purposes.
Accordingly, discretion is left to the management to devise a reporting
pattern appropriate to the particular company's operations and responsive
to its organizational concepts. 21
This, of course, parallels the approach recommended by Mau.tz.
If a company has more than one line of business, it must report the
revenues and the profitability of each. The basic reporting may be in terms
of dollars or percentages; net income is to be stated before income taxes and
extraordinary items. If allocation of common costs or the pricing of intra-
corporate transfers materially affects the contribution of a line to net in-
come, then the methods of allocating common costs and of pricing intra-
corporate transfers, and material changes in these methods between periods
and the effect thereof, should be disclosed. The new rules do recognize that
in some instances it may be extremely difficult for a corporation to report
upon a line of business in the required manner. In such cases, the company
21 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4988 (July 14, 1969).
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may state the contribution to results of operations "most closely approach-
ing such [net] income" and explain why it is not practicable to state contri-
bution to net income or loss.
Not every "line of business" is required to be separately reported.
Corporations which have had sales and revenues in excess of $50 million
during either of the last two fiscal years must make separate disclosure with
respect to any line of business accounting for 10 percent or more of sales
and revenues or income before taxes and extraordinary items during any one
of the two preceding years; the breakpoint is 15 percent for companies with
sales and revenues of $50 million or less. In determining whether the 10 per-
cent or 15 percent standard is met with respect to profit contribution, the
profits of all lines of business that made profits are added and no allowance
is made for losses.
The rules also require that any line of business which has had a loss
during either of the two preceding fiscal years equal to 10 percent or more
(15 percent or more for the $50 million and under business) of the total
profits of the profit-making lines of business must be reported upon. Thus,
if a corporation had lines of business with profits of $1, $2, and $3 million,
and a fourth with a loss of $7 million, all segments would have to be re-
ported upon even though the corporation as a whole showed a $1 million
loss, inasmuch as each of the segments accounted for more than 10 percent
of the profit disregarding the loss of the $7 million, which in turn would
be more than 10 percent (or 15 percent if applicable) of the $6 million ag-
gregate profits of the other lines. In any event, if the number of lines of
business which would have to be reported upon as a consequence of apply-
ing these rules exceeds 10, segmented reporting is required only with respect
to the 10 lines "deemed most important to an understanding of the busi-
ness."
The requirement of reporting 10 percent segments in large companies
has been criticized as being inconsistent with other requirements which
focused on 15 percent and also as perhaps leading to unrealistic fragmenta-
tion, particularly in years when profits may be depressed. For instance, for
a year when a large company had profits of, say, $1 million, a very small seg-
ment with $100,000 profits would have to report separately.
The periods to be covered by the line of business reporting are (i) the
fiscal years since the commencement of the business, (ii) the last five fiscal
years, or (iii) the fiscal years ending after December 31, 1966, whichever are
less. There is no requirement for line of business reporting for interim
periods. These provisions were intended to meet the criticism that many
companies would find it very difficult to reach back a significant period of
time to reconstruct the required information.
PRODUCT LINES
The new rules have not completely superseded the previous require-
ments of Forms S-1, S-7 and 10 with respect to the reporting of the relative
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importance of each product or service or class of similar products or services
which contributed 15 percent or more to the gross volume of business done
during the last fiscal year. The old rule has generally been interpreted as
requiring at least a statement of the sales and revenues derived from such
different products or services and perhaps some indication of comparative
profitability. 22 The new provisions of the Forms require disclosure for the
periods for which line of business reporting is required of the amount or
percentage of total sales and revenues contributed by each class of similar
products or services which contributed 10 percent or more to total sales
and revenues in either of the last two fiscal years (15 percent or more if the
total sales and revenues did not exceed $50 million in either of such years).
Thus, a "unitary" company engaged in a single "line of business," but none-
theless having different classes of similar products or services, is required to
disclose sales and revenues from the various products or services but not the
profitability. That profitability disclosure is not, contrary to the concern of
some, required for products or services or classes of them is clearly indicated
in the Commission release which finalized the rules:
It should also be noted that to the extent such classification is not coinci-
dent with the company's determination of its lines of business or where the
company is not engaged in more than one line of business, disclosure is
limited to proportion of sales and revenues and does not require a showing
of contribution to earnings.23
In many instances a company's classes of similar products or services
will be the same as its lines of business; the new provisions expressly recog-
nize this and indicate that disclosures with respect to product line revenue
and line of business profitability may be combined. This provision makes
clear that "classes of similar products and services" are not the same as
"lines of business"; in other words, it is not "product line reporting" that
is demanded by the new disclosures.
Perhaps of more significance than the exact terms of the new require-
ments will be the manner in which the Securities and Exchange Commission
staff interprets and applies them. If the staff genuinely accepts the attitude
expressed in the new Release, to the effect that management is in the best
position to determine the lines of business in which its enterprise is engaged,
compliance may not be as difficult as many have anticipated. On the other
hand, if it appears that managements take advantage of the latitude afforded
them for the purpose of avoiding meaningful disclosure (one such means
would be by asserting that the company had many, many lines of business,
none of which accounted for 10 percent [or, where appropriate, 15 percent]
of gross revenues or profits), then it is likely that the Commission will adopt
more exacting standards for determining lines of business.
Thus far, the administration of these rules by the Commission staff
appears to have been light-handed. For instance, Monsanto Company,
22 Supra at pp. 927-28.
28 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4988 (July 14, 1969) (emphasis added).
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with profits of over $100 million, and which described itself in its pre-
liminary prospectus as "an integrated chemical company engaged in the
manufacture and sale of a widely-diversified line of products derived pri-
marily from petroleum and natural gas" and stated that "the conversion of
basic chemicals, plastics and fibers into finished products is becoming a
more important part of Monsanto's business," succeeded in convincing the
staff that it was truly unitary and that it should not be compelled to report
separately with respect to fibers and plastics, largely because of their inti-
mate interweaving with chemicals. 24
SPECIAL SOURCES OF REVENUE
Among the most controversial portions of the initial Commission pro-
posal were the requirements that where 10 percent or more of total sales
and revenues or net income was derived from overseas operations, from
government procurement, or from a single customer, information with
regard to revenues and profitability from such sources would have to be
separately reported. The torrent of criticism which met this proposal
blunted, but did not defeat, the Commission's attack on these problems.2 5
Single Customers
With respect to the disclosure of business done with a single customer,
or a very few customers, the new provisions simply adopt a portion of the
"Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements" (Guides).2 6
Item 27 of those Guides and the corresponding provision of the amendments
to Forms S-l, S-7 and 10 require that
[i]f a substantial part [the new requirements refer to "a material part"]
of the business of the registrant [the new requirements add "and its
subsidiaries"] is dependent upon a single customer, or a very few customers,
the loss of any one of which would have a materially adverse effect on the
registrant, the name of the customer or customers and other material
24 This statement appeared in the preliminary prospectus dated September 4, 1969 of
Monsanto Company:
With the exception of certain product lines representing in each case less than
10%0 of total net sales and total net income, Monsanto's chemical business, which
the Company regards as a single line of business, is characterized by common raw
material sources, interrelation of feedstocks, substantial inter-divisional transfer
and considerable dependence of transfer costs on over-all volumes. Although the
determination of net income by product groups is necessarily arbitrary because of
these factors, it can generally be stated that over the last five years man-made
fibers have consistently represented a greater percentage of net income than net
sales, while plastics, resins and coatings have represented a lesser percentage of
net income than net sales. Products for agriculture have generally contributed a
higher percentage of net income than net sales, except for 1968 when net sales
were adversely affected by depressed ammonia prices and by prior year herbicide
inventory buildups by dealers.
25 For a summary of criticism received by the Commission in response to the revision
of its original release, see BNA, SEc. Ra. & L. RRP., No. 4, at A-5 et seq. (June 25, 1969).
26 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968).
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facts with respect to their relationship, if any, to the registrant and the
importance of the business to the registrant should be included.27
Even before the Guides, this information was frequently requested by the
Commission staff in connection with registration statements, although it
was possible, upon presentation of persuasive reasons, to secure forbearance
from the staff with respect to this disclosure. With this matter now formal-
ized by incorporation in the Forms themselves, it is likely to become harder
than it was before to dissuade the staff from insisting upon the inclusion of
this information.
Overseas Operations
With regard to material operations outside the United States, the new
requirements provide that
appropriate disclosure shall be made with respect to the importance of
that part of the business to the registrant and the risks attendant thereto.
Insofar as practicable, furnish information with respect to volume and
relative profitability of such business.28
This language represents something of a retreat from the position initially
taken by the Commission with regard to overseas operations. It does not
include an absolute requirement that net income before taxes and extraor-
dinary items be stated with respect to overseas business; it would appear that
something less than full profitability disclosure is sufficient- perhaps some-
thing along the order of a statement of the amount of aggregate sales ac-
counted for by overseas business, coupled with a declaration to the effect
that such operations were substantially more (or less) profitable than those
conducted in the United States.
Many commentators have remarked upon the possibly misleading im-
plications of a disclosure of profitability of overseas operations.29 Expenses
of development are often borne by domestic operations, so that when the
product is introduced abroad, the income is free from such expenses. This
may, many feel, have unfortunate trade policy results by leading overseas
customers to believe they are being charged excessively.
However, it should be remarked that this proposal is not really revolu-
tionary; the accounting profession itself has suggested that assets and
liabilities, income and losses, of foreign operations should usually be sep-
arately stated.3 0
Regulated Business
Information concerning sales, revenues and income from different
classes of products or services in operations regulated by federal, state or
27 Id., at No. 17.
28 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4988 (July 14, 1969).
29 Letter from Financial Executives Institute to Securities and Exchange Commission,
Oct. 14, 1968.
30 AICPA, Foreign Operations and Foreign Exchange, ARB No. 43, at ch. 12 (1965).
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municipal authorities can be limited to those classes of products or services
required by "any uniform system of accounts prescribed by such authorities."
This appears to represent a substantial dilution of the earlier proposal,
which would have required disclosure of profitability on government pro.
curement if it amounted to 10 percent of sales or more. It is somewhat
difficult to ascertain from these provisions the manner in which the required
disclosure should be made or to whom it applies. The provision applies only
to "operations regulated by Federal, state or municipal authorities."' Is a
company engaged in defense contracting "regulated by Federal ... authori-
ties"? Or rather, does this apply simply to operations such as utilities, rail-
roads, or buslines? What of broker-dealers who are closely regulated by
federal and state authorities? This provision, perhaps more than any other,
is difficult to decipher and susceptible of varying interpretations.
A very controversial proposal originally put forth by the Commission
was the requirement that the assets used in each reported segment be dis-
closed. This brought forth a flood of criticism and protest, based largely
upon the difficulties of making any meaningful allocation of assets among
classes of products or services (the initial basis of breakdown) or, as later
adopted, lines of business. This provision has now been abandoned,
presumably much to the relief of those who found it excessively onerous.
However, its exclusion does prevent any analysis of return on investment
of the various segments, generally a most meaningful figure.
ANNUAL REPORTS
As noted earlier, these new requirements are confined to registration
Forms S-1, S-7 and 10. This means that the burden of line of business
reporting is placed on a company only when it seeks to distribute securities
or when it initially comes under the requirements of the 1934 Act (many
companies, e.g., those previously required to file periodic reports, do not
have to file a Form 10 when they register securities under the 1934 Act).
The proposals deliberately avoided more extensive requirements pending
the completion of the Wheat Report. As expected, the Wheat Report 2
strongly recommended that Form 10-K be revised to require an annual
reporting with respect to the profitability of segments, and the Commission
has proposed a revision of Form 10-K which would adopt reporting require-
ments similar to those incorporated in Forms S-1, S-7 and 10.88
It might be noted in passing that the problem of conglomerate dis-
closure is not confined to the United States. The London Stock Exchange
requires that listed companies report segmented profits. In addition, the
British Companies Act of 1967 requires that "if, in the course of a financial
year, a company ... has carried on business of two or more classes ... that,
81 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936, at 36 (Dec. 9, 1968).
32 SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS, A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
UNDER THE '83 AND '84 ACTS 358 (CCH ed. 1969).
88 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8682 (Sept. 15, 1969).
SEC REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
in the opinion of the directors, differ substantially from each other," then
the "directors' report" (that is, the annual report) must state the sales of
the classes and "the extent or approximate extent (expressed, in either case,
in monetary terms) to which, in the opinion of the directors, the carrying
on of business of that class contributed to, or restricted, the profit or loss
of the company for that year before taxation."3 4 It is significant that the
determination of whether a company has carried on business of two or more
classes is left to the judgment of the directors without any criteria stated
for making that determination.
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
While the present Commission action with respect to conglomerate
reporting had its origins not in securities law considerations but rather in
antitrust concerns, it is apparent on the face of these requirements that the
additional information disclosed will not necessarily be of much assistance
to those seeking to appraise the impact of the merger movement. For in-
stance, it will be difficult, if not impossible, from the disclosures now re-
quired by the Commission to determine whether a conglomerate is delib-
erately lowering prices on some products to secure competitive advantage
and making up for such reduced profits by increasing prices on other items
where competition is less intense. Conclusions concerning the extent of
concentration may be facilitated to some extent, but in many instances the
meaningful information may be effectively obscured.
The realization that the newly required disclosures will be of limited
assistance to those concerned with antitrust matters is evident in Senator
Gaylord Nelson's letter to Chairman Budge. In that letter (which is dated
June 20, 1969, and was thus written before finalization of the Commission's
proposals), after reviewing the history of the Commission proposals, the
Senator stated:
Notwithstanding my feeling that the proposed amendment will be of
limited utility in ameliorating the competitive information problem that
has so long troubled my Subcommittee, I do believe that they are desirable
and I regret that they have been delayed for so many months in becoming
effective. 35
The necessity of further profitability disclosure was also adverted to in the
White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy,3 6 where it was indi-
cated that additional disclosure with regard to conglomerate firms should
be required in the interest of effective antitrust policy, without, however,
specifying the particulars of such increased disclosure.
In many respects the new rules do not satisfy the security analysts either.
34 Companies Act 1967, ch. 81, § 17, at 1788-89.
35 Letter from Senator Gaylord Nelson to Chairman Hamer Budge, June 20, 1969.
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As mentioned, by eliminating the requirement of disclosure of assets used
in the various segments, determination of effectiveness in the utilization of
resources in the reporting company's various activities is precluded. Further,
by vesting in management such broad discretion in determining lines of
business, by rejecting mechanical tests such as the Standard Industrial
Classification, and by allowing broad discretion in allocating central costs
and pricing intracorporate transfers, comparability of the operations of
similar segments of various companies, one of the principal expressed ob-
jectives of the analysts in pressing for enhanced disclosure, has been
eliminated.
Still, for all their inadequacies in the eyes of interested groups, the
new rules will yield substantial additional information; the extent to which
it is useful information has yet to be determined.
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS
It is apparent that the development of conglomerate reporting is far
from concluded. It is likely to be continued in three directions:
First, it is almost certain that in the not too distant future (perhaps
by the time this paper is published) disclosure of profitability with respect
to lines of business will be required by the Commission in its periodic re-
porting system, as well as when a company proposes to make a distribution
of securities or to list securities on an exchange, or becomes subject to sec-
tion 12(g) of the 1934 Act.
Second, as experience tests the feasibility of the new requirements, it
is not unlikely that modifications may be made, some by way of fleshing
out ambiguous concepts such as "line of business," others by expansions that
will yield more significant aggregating and fragmenting of data for invest-
ment purposes.3 7
Third, unsatisfied by the new Commission requirements, those in-
terested in antitrust matters will press hard for additional disclosure. To
this end Senator Nelson is apparently in the process of framing legislation
to require additional public disclosure of information by conglomerates.
It is not unlikely that this legislation will go well beyond the present
pattern of disclosure required by the Commission. Chairman Budge has
indicated in his response to Senator Nelson that he does not regard a legis-
37 An interesting proposed extension of conglomerate reporting is persuasively set
forth in A. RAPPAPORT & E. LERNER, A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING By DIvERsI-
FIED COMPANIES (1969), a research study published by the National Association of Ac-
countants. The authors propose that "Financial Statements should ... be designed to pro-
vide the investor with current earnings arranged in a format which can serve as a basis for
estimating growth and future earnings." The authors suggest that earnings of "basic
activities" be arranged in a manner that clearly displays the amount of earnings derived
from activities with varying rates of growth, that is, the proportion of earnings which is
attributable to activities which have experienced a 0 to 5 percent growth rate annually,
the amount attributable to activities which have experienced a 5 to 10 percent growth
rate, etc.
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lative endeavor for antitrust purposes as inconsistent with the work of the
Commission in the area of conglomerate disclosure. The extent to which
such legislation will seek to make the Securities and Exchange Commission
the vehicle for securing this information is uncertain. The report of the
White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy would place this additional
burden on the Commission:
We recommend that the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 authorizing the SEC to specify the details of financial reports "for
the protection of investors and to ensure fair dealing" in the securities
markets be expanded to recognize the impact of profit and loss information
on the operation of competitive markets, and to require that the SEC
issue regulations implementing these provisions after consulting with
the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission.38
It is far from certain that burdening the Commission with the responsibility
of supplying data for antitrust policy and enforcement is a wise move, for
such a course could quickly dilute the time and energy of the Commission
when the securities markets demand all there is available.
It is probable that, as happened after the enactment of the Securities
Act of 1933, once the new disclosure becomes a way of life, the forebodings
and alarms will be forgotten and no one will be seriously harmed. It is
heartening that during the course of the controversy, business voices often
declared that far from being a curse, conglomerate reporting had affirmative
benefits for business.3 9 In time perhaps this will become a consensus.
Whether it does or not, it is unlikely that the pressures for fuller disclosure
can be successfully resisted.
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